Are Spinozistic Ideas Cartesian Judgements? :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Are Spinozistic Ideas Cartesian Judgements?AbstractSome commentators of Spinoza declare that Spinozistic ideas are judgements. I shall call this consider the common interpretation, since it is popular to interpret Spinoza as reacting against Descartess theory of ideas and therefore consider Spinozistic ideas not as Cartesian ideas, but as Cartesian judgements. The clearest difference between Descartes and Spinoza here is that whereas Descartes thought that ideas are passive, Spinoza thought the opposite. The concept of activity plays accordingly an important role in interpreting Spinozas theory of ideas. According to the common interpretation Spinoza and Descartes use the concept of activity in the same way. And since Descartes thought that judgements are active, it is maintained that the Spinozistic, active ideas are like Cartesian judgements. I find that the considerations according to which the activity of Spinozistic ideas is seen in the light of Descartess distinction between action and passion are based on too superficial an interpretation of Spinoza. I argue that what Spinoza means by saying that ideas are active does not merely mean that they are active in a Cartesian sense. He has in mind something excess to the mere Cartesian activity. Whereas Spinoza wants to say that active ideas incorporate the property of truth or certainty, Descartes does not think in that way about judgements. Thus, the Spinozistic ideas buttocks be called truth-expressing. IntroductionRen Descartes brought the concept of idea into a central place in epistemology. Another famous rationalistBenedictus de Spinozamade use of the same term idea, but had an entirely different view concerning the nature of ideas. Whereas Descartes thought that ideas are passive, Spinoza had the opposite view according to which ideas are active. In this paper I shall examine what Spinoza means by the activity of ideas. According to some commentators Spinozistic ideas should be seen as Cartesian jud gements. I call this view the common interpretation and I shall argue that it does not capture the whole of Spinozas theory of active ideas. The activity of Spinozistic ideas is something more than merely the mannequin of activity found in Cartesian judgements. In the first part I will sketch Descartes conception of ideas as passive. In the second and triplet part I move on the outline Spinozas position and point out that there are passages which motivate the common interpretation. In the fourth part I will proceed to argue that the activity of Spinozistic ideas is not merely that of Cartesian judgements.